As for Pinduoduo, although it also launched CPS business He Tuber earlier. However, due to the underlying logic of the platform’s low prices, there is not enough room for premiums for CPS promoters to make profits. Therefore, compared with the growth rate of the total transaction volume of its platform, the CPS section is still far behind the Taobao Alliance.

In this industry, there are also some training service providers and tool service providers such as Taoke, which are continuing to evolve.

After 2017, the large-scale promotion of the CPS industry in Tencent’s ecosystem soon led to frequent attacks by Tencent.

At this time, Tencent has not yet proposed a 2B industrial Internet strategy, so it is not aware of the rationality of private sector retail and has not assumed the main responsibility for its private sector retail infrastructure. On the contrary, it only views these "saboteurs" from a 2C perspective.

After being frequently rectified, a large number of CPS promoters began to make Taoke-like apps out of security considerations and user retention needs. The core idea is to use a multi-level interest bundling model to achieve user fission development and customer acquisition, and to carry out e-commerce sales and share commissions. Some channels that have done micro-business direct sales have begun to join this wave.

Looking back at the background of the rise of social e-commerce, it is also closely related to the e-commerce market environment at that time. The CPS platform, which has worked hard for the platform for many years, feels deeply insecure about the platform's ever-changing policies. It is attacked from both sides by Alibaba and Tencent. Its life is always at the mercy of the platform's policies, and from time to time it is "swept out of the world" by giants.

Therefore, CPS players who received the first wave of dividends began to launch their own e-commerce APPs in order to capture users, traffic and supply chains in their own hands. The idea is that even if they cannot do Taobao and JD.com, they will become a self-closed loop small ecosystem. It's also safer.

In a sense, if social e-commerce follows its original intention, scientifically designs its business model, and does not adopt a fission method that is eager for quick success, there may be a large number of vertical e-commerce.

It is a pity that history has no ifs. Coupled with the consumption upgrade and capital market speculation at that time, social e-commerce quickly became popular and quickly became dizzy.

Ironically, the capital market’s hype on social e-commerce is based on Pinduoduo. However, players generally do not learn Pinduoduo or understand the essence of Pinduoduo, but directly copy the direct sales model. This is one of the reasons why Huang Zheng disdainfully defined Pinduoduo as a social e-commerce company.

The social e-commerce model, which uses multi-level fission as the basic means of traffic, has rapidly emerged with a large number of players.

This is true for online Global Catcher, Yunji, Beidian, Darling's Home, Peanut Diary, Miyuan, Fenxiang Life, Haosheng, Meiguang, Taojiji, and Future Market. The offline Xingsheng Youxuan, etc. are also similar. In addition, there are a large number of micro-business team leaders who, although they do not have products, have actually established their own private e-commerce platforms based on this model, such as Chenyi Story.

At that time, some powerful private domain team leaders could quickly fission their team members to tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands through multi-level mechanisms. The high commission incentives also stimulated more participants to join the game.

Even Alibaba and JD.com, which have always been cautious, couldn't help but join in and build Taoxiaopu and Fenxiang. However, out of caution, one adopted an agency operation method and the other adopted an investment method to isolate their own risks. Of course the end result is the same. With the tightening of policies and heavy regulatory strikes, social e-commerce has failed one after another.

On the positive side, social e-commerce has further promoted the development of private retail compared to the early Taoke. Specifically, it is reflected in the following aspects.

At the user level, because social e-commerce mostly adopts a membership model and emphasizes long-term relationships, it achieves refined user operations through hierarchical management, which is precisely a necessary step for private sector retail to build long-term repurchase relationships. Compared with the early days of Taoke, which violently solicited groups and violently issued orders, this is a positive step forward. But looking back at history, we have to think deeply about whether to use manual or technical means to solve the problem in the future, or a combination of both.

Secondly, social e-commerce has made meaningful attempts in developing private domain traffic. In the early days of Taobao, there was no substantial innovation in the fission and development of private domain traffic, so they were regularly strangled by the platform. Although this traffic pattern innovation was unsuccessful, lessons can be learned for the future. In addition, compared to the weak connections and enabling relationships between Taobao customers, social e-commerce generally attaches great importance to improving the ability of subordinate relationships and building traffic. This is essentially the same as today's anchor capacity incubation by MCN organizations. , which provides incremental value from the traffic level.

The refined division of labor in the supply chain, expansion, training, operations, tools and other private sector cooperation chains also provides ideas for the productization of the private sector retail industry chain in the future. The finer the division of labor, the lower the industry threshold and the more participants.

Finally, social e-commerce has truly broken through Taoke’s role as a single channel.